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1. OVERVIEW OF THE MANAGEMENT 
CONSULTING INDUSTRY 
Despite current popularity and astounding growth rates, management 
consulting remains one of the least researched and written about 
industries (Gagnon 1984). We take for granted that the industry should 
exist and function in the way it does. Yet the tremendous growth of the 
management consulting industry over the last twenty years cannot be 
explained easily. As “Bernie Ramsbottom” of the Financial Times (April 
11, 1981) put it: 
Of all the businesses, by far  
Consultancy’s the most bizarre.  
For to the penetrating eye,  
There’s no apparent reason why,  
With no more assets than a pen,  
This group of personable men  
Can sell to clients more than twice  
The same ridiculous advice,  
Or find, in such a rich profusion,  
Problems to fit their own solution. 
Solely for purposes of analysis in this paper, management consultants are 
defined as those who provide general management advice within a 
strategic, organisational, or operational context, and who are 
institutionally organised in firms. It excludes other types of consulting, 
and it excludes management consultants who are not institutionally 
A slightly diffferent version of this paper was published in the Journal of Management 
Consulting as “The Logic of Management Consulting”. Part 1 appeared in 1998, volume 
10, pages 3-11; Part 2 appeared in 1999, volume 10, pages 3-12 (Canbäck 1998, 1999).   4
organised. My estimate is that the chosen segment of the consulting 
market accounts for around 30 to 40 per cent of total consulting revenues, 
and 80 per cent of management consulting revenues. 
What is management consulting? According to Greiner and Metzger 
(1983): “management consulting is an advisory service contracted for and 
provided to organizations by specially trained and qualified persons who 
assist, in an objective and independent manner, the client organization to 
identify management problems, analyze such problems, recommend 
solutions to these problems, and help, when requested, in the 
implementation of solutions.” 
There are a few key words in this definition. “Advisory service” indicates 
that consultants are responsible for the quality of their advice, but they do 
not substitute for managers and have no formal authority. “Objective and 
independent” indicates financial, administrative, political, and emotional 
independence from the client (Kubr 1996). “Trained and qualified” shows 
that a consultant is more than the individual and his or her personal 
experience. As will be seen, these elements in the makeup of management 
consulting sometimes contribute to the demand for external consulting 
services, and sometimes detract from it.   5
1.1  HISTORY OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTING 
Within the context of the above definition, management consulting has a 
long history (see Moore 1982; Kubr 1996; UNCTAD 1993). The first 
management consultants appeared around the turn of the last century and 
included individuals such as Frederick Taylor, Henry Gantt, Arthur D. 
Little and Harrington Emerson, all of whom are still famous for their 
contributions to the science of management. Little and Emerson also 
started two of the first consulting firms. These pioneers were mainly 
concerned with operational efficiency issues such as Taylor’s time-and-
motion theory. 
Between 1910 and 1940, a second generation of consultants expanded the 
concept of management consulting. Edwin Booz started offering “business 
research services” in 1914, and James O. McKinsey started McKinsey & 
Company in 1926. In Europe, Lyndon Urwick and Charles Bedeaux were 
pioneers who contributed extensively to defining management consulting 
in the 1920s. These consultants pioneered or implemented techniques such 
as budgeting processes, the divisionalised organisation, merit-based 
compensation schemes, and forecasting techniques. 
During the early post-war years, and in many cases growing out of 
wartime experience, consulting experienced a big surge with the   6
formation of such firms as Cresap, McCormick & Paget, William E. Hill, 
Bruce Payne & Associates, Hay Associates and Towers Perrin. 
Three major developments took place in the 1960s. First, Bruce Henderson 
moved from the Arthur D. Little firm to start the Boston Consulting Group 
in 1963, and more or less single-handedly operationalised the concepts of 
strategy and strategy consulting. Out of this sprang a second generation of 
strategy specialists such as Bain & Company, Strategic Planning 
Associates, Braxton Associates, LEK Partnership, and Monitor Company. 
Second, the major accounting firms started responding to the growth of 
management consulting and created management advisory service groups 
to augment their core accounting practices. Today the consulting practices 
of Andersen Worldwide, PricewaterhouseCoopers, Deloitte & Touche and 
Ernst & Young often rival the accounting activities of these firms in size. 
And third, also starting in the 1960s with the emergence of Cambridge 
Research Institute and Management Analysis Center, firms 
institutionalising the combined consulting practices of leading academics 
and practitioners began to make their presence known. 
Even as late as 1980, despite a growing proliferation of specialties, 
management consulting was still in its infancy as an industry with   7
perhaps around 18,000 practicing management consultants worldwide, 
and only 30 to 40 per cent of these employed in the large, institutionally 
organised firms of the type mentioned above’ (Consultants News 1982-
1998; Payne 1986). Even the largest consulting firm in those days, Booz 
Allen & Hamilton, had revenues of only around $150 million. The 
industry as a whole had revenues of $1.2 billion in the United States, and 
worldwide perhaps $2 billion.1 
Over the next seventeen years, the management consulting industry grew 
to around $35 billion globally. The annual growth rate was more than 20 
per cent. Today there are approximately 140,000 consultants worldwide (a 
considerable percentage of the more recent growth is accounted for by 
information technology projects manned less by management consultants 
than by systems integration specialists). 
This growth is impressive, but the true importance of the industry’s 
evolution is the accumulation of institutional knowledge. In 1980 there 
were less than five consulting firms with more than 1,000 consultants. 
Today, there are more than thirty. If the experience curve applies in 
consulting services, then it may be noteworthy that approximately 80 per 
cent of all consulting experience was generated in the last seventeen years, 
                                                 
1  The numbers presented in this section are the author's reconciliation of several sources. They are 
broadly in line with those of most observers.   8
and only 20 per cent in the period from 1886 (when Arthur D. Little started 
the first consulting firm) to 1980. As we will see, this has had profound 
implications for the division of labour and the balance of power between 
consultants and clients. 
1.2  MANAGEMENT CONSULTING’S IMPORTANCE 
More than just a growth industry, management consulting in and of it self 
is one of the most important and enduring management techniques 
developed over the last fifty years. A secondary effect of this invention has 
been the rapid dissemination of new frameworks, tools and techniques in 
large companies. 
Surprisingly, however, not much has been written about this 
phenomenon. In part, it could be because few are interested in the topic—
it is still seen as an admission of failure by many managers to use 
consultants; and who wants to read about failure? In part it could be 
because the management consulting firms are highly secretive, and thus 
difficult to analyse and understand. 
A few facts and observations do speak for themselves. Management 
consulting firms today employ around 25 per cent of the graduates from 
the leading business schools, and those graduates are usually among the   9
top performers in their class. Some traditional companies have essentially 
given up recruiting at these schools because consulting firms and 
investment banks can offer what is perceived as more career opportunity, 
better pay, and a more stimulating environment than traditional 
companies in the manufacturing or service sectors. 
Another aspect is that today there are approximately 70,000 management 
consultants in the United States, compared to around 150,000 executives of 
the type consultants normally interact with at firms governed through 
“complex” management (Granovetter 1984). That is, for each executive 
there are 0.5 management consultants who advise, full time. In 1980, this 
ratio was approximately 0.1. Clearly, and without inferring any judgment 
on the relative contribution of executives and consultants, the balance of 
influence is shifting dramatically. 
Finally, several industry observers, including Payne (1986), argue that 
innovation in areas such as strategy is dominated by management 
consultants, and not by managers or academics. The same is probably true 
for other management disciplines. Take, for example, reengineering in its 
various incarnations. 
Consequently, management consultants have had a large impact on the 
state of management due to both the quantity and quality of contributions.   10
Yet, this does not explain why management consultants “exist”. It is not 
clear why managers would want to give away so much of their 
companies’ intellectual agenda to outsiders. It is not obvious why it is 
more cost effective to hire experts from the outside than to do the same 
work internally in companies. And even if it were, why is this happening 
on a massive scale now, and not sixty years ago? Why is it happening in 
the United States, for example, but only to a limited extent in Japan? 
Before addressing these issues in Chapters 4 and 5, Chapter 2 delineates 
the roles and tasks of management consultants by reviewing the relevant 
literature, and Chapter 3 introduces transaction cost theory to provide the 
theoretical underpinning for explaining why management consultants 
exist.   11
2. MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS’ ROLES  AND 
TASKS 
This chapter summarises various perspectives on what management 
consultants actually do, that is, their roles and tasks. First, the writings of 
several academics are reviewed. Then, the same is done for a few 
management consulting practitioners. 
2.1 ACADEMICS’  VIEWS 
Schein (1988) categorised management consultants with respect to the role 
they play in their interaction with clients. He distinguished between three 
models of consultation: purchase of expertise, doctor-patient and process 
consultation. 
The purchase-of-expertise model is used by clients who require the 
consultant to bring their own independent perspective on the industry and 
the issues at hand. In its purest form, the consultant is not expected to 
interact extensively with the client but rather to provide his or her 
expertise in a hands-off relationship. 
In the doctor-patient model, the consultant emphasises his or her 
diagnostic capability by carefully analysing the client organisation’s 
problems. Using their often unique experience base and diagnostic skill,   12
consultants quickly assess strategic and organisational blockages. This 
model leads to an intimate and often trust-based relationship between the 
consultant and the client. 
The process consultation model builds on the notion that the consultant is 
the facilitator, while the client contributes the expertise. Thus, there is a 
clear division of roles and tasks. The client ultimately chooses what to do 
about a problem. The consultant, on the other hand, provides a 
methodology for defining the problem and finding the best possible 
solutions. The similarity to psychological analysis methods is not 
coincidental. Schein’s classification reflects a range of roles, from the 
consultant as a content provider to the consultant as a process provider. 
A similar segmentation is suggested by Nees and Greiner (1985), who 
divide strategy consultants into five categories: 
•  The “mental adventurer” analyses truly intransigent problems, such as 
long-term scenarios for country development, by applying rigorous 
economic methods and leveraging his or her experience base. 
•  The “strategic navigator” bases his or her contribution on a rich 
quantitative understanding of the market and competitive dynamics,   13
and then recommends courses of action without too much regard of 
the client’s own perspective. 
•  The “management physician” derives his or her recommendations 
from a deep understanding of the internal dynamics of the client 
organisation, often willingly sacrificing some objectivity to gain a 
realistic perspective on what is achievable. 
•  The “system architect” impacts his or her clients by helping redesign 
processes, routines, and systems—always in close cooperation with the 
client. 
•  The “friendly co-pilot” counsels senior managers as a facilitator rather 
than as an expert, and has no ambition to provide new knowledge to 
the client. 
The mental adventurer broadly corresponds to Schein’s expert model; the 
strategic navigator, management physician, and system architect 
correspond to his doctor-patient model; and the friendly co-pilot is similar 
to the process consultation model. 
Nees and Greiner further showed that institutionally organised strategy 
consultants are found primarily in the strategic navigator and   14
management physician segments. The Boston Consulting Group, Bain & 
Company, and Monitor Company are examples of the former, and 
McKinsey & Company of the latter. Clearly, the role of the consultant in 
both segments requires a relationship between client and consultant that 
goes beyond a contractually specified arms-length relationship. 
Turner (1982) used a hierarchy of tasks to demonstrate the extent of a 
consultant’s involvement with a client. He argued that until the late 1970s, 
the consultant often worked as a supplier to the client, but that the 
relationship increasingly is built on a partnership of mutual respect aimed 
at fundamentally improving the client’s effectiveness. Turner used eight 
task categories to delineate management consulting approaches. The first 
five correspond to the traditional arms-length supplier status; the last 
three are newer, evolving tasks: 
1.  Providing information to a client 
2.  Solving a client’s problem 
3.  Making a diagnosis, which may necessitate redefinition of the problem 
4.  Making recommendations based on the diagnosis   15
5.  Assisting with implementation of recommended actions 
6.  Building a consensus and commitment around corrective action 
7.  Facilitating client learning 
8.  Permanently improving organisational effectiveness. 
Most management consulting firms today aspire to work on the higher 
value-added activities at the lower end of the list. Thus, it is once again 
clear that management consultants’ relationships with their clients are 
becoming increasingly complex, and that these relationships rely more 
and more on sophisticated contractual arrangements of a primarily 
informal nature, such as trust. However, research has also shown 
(Leontiades and Ahmet 1989) that management consultants still have a 
long way to go before they exert major influence on the core issues of their 
clients. A chief executive is more likely to be influenced first by his or her 
own instincts and thinking on a particular subject, followed by the 
planning staff, the board of directors, and investment bankers, than by 
consultants. Thus, it is unclear how far down the task hierarchy 
management consultants have really moved.   16
2.2 PRACTITIONERS’  VIEWS 
Marvin Bower (1982), the driving force behind McKinsey & Company over 
almost half a century, suggested six reasons why hiring external 
consultants makes sense in many situations: (1) they provide competence 
not available internally, (2) they have varied experience outside the client, 
(3) they have time to study the problems, (4) they are professionals, (5) 
they are independent, and (6) they have the ability to create action based 
on their recommendations. However, he does not make clear why most of 
these statements should be true. 
In large companies, the core market for management consultants, most of 
the skills provided by consultants should ostensibly be available internally 
because large companies have encountered most classes of problems. 
Arguably, creating the time to study a problem should simply be a matter 
of priority setting. That the degree of professionalism is automatically 
higher within a consulting firm is not obvious. Furthermore, there are 
arguments both for and against the proposition that consultants are more 
independent than internal managers and experts. Finally, the superior 
ability to create action, attributed to consultants by Bower, appears to be a 
matter of training and methods and not intrinsic to the consulting 
capability. Thus, only the second statement—that consultants have varied 
experience outside the client—appears to be correct, prima facie.   17
Implicit in Bower’s argument, however, is the belief that consultants work 
primarily with Schein’s first two models, the expert and patient-doctor 
models, since the consultant is expected to provide an independent 
perspective on the substantive issues at hand. In Turner’s hierarchy, this 
corresponds to the lower levels. Bower appears to see the consultant as a 
partner to the client in solving unstructured, difficult problems, rather 
than as a supplier of packaged methods and approaches. 
Bruce Henderson, the force behind the Boston Consulting Group for many 
years, had a similar perspective (Hagedorn 1982). He argued that 
consultants add significant value to society (through their clients) by 
reducing the problem-solving cycle time. Exactly why management 
consultants have more of this capability than others is, however, unclear. 
But as with Bower, Henderson’s implicit argument is that management 
consultants work together with their clients in a complicated relationship 
to jointly solve the problems at hand. Henderson also argued that the 
consultant needs to work in a specialised institutional environment that 
takes into account that the key resource is the body of consultants, a highly 
mobile resource, and that a consulting environment is characterised by 
instability. 
Kelley (1979) made a contrary argument to Bower and Henderson based 
on interviews with more than 200 internal consultants at various   18
companies. Among other things, he argued that external consultants are 
more expensive than internal consultants, they are not available at the 
right time, and they lack an understanding of the client’s environment. 
This reduces the external consultant’s effectiveness. Kelley also predicted 
that the bulk of consulting work will be carried out by internal resources 
in the future and that external consultants will be used only for special 
problems and when there is a need to augment the internal resources. As 
was quantified earlier in this paper, Kelley has been proven wrong by 
events, and the management consulting industry is today many times 
larger than when he wrote his article. In fact, we will see later that external 
management consultants are cost effective, available, and adept at 
understanding their client’s problems and circumstances. 
The preceding summary of the literature points to a number of 
propositions: 
•  Management consultants increasingly address critical, long-term issues 
of their clients and are a significant part of the intellectual agenda of 
executives (corresponding to Turner’s three lower levels). 
•  Consultants add value by addressing both content and process issues 
based on expertise, methodology, and general problem-solving skills 
(corresponding to Schein’s expert and doctor-patient models).   19
•  Management consultants work together with their clients in a 
complicated and fluid relationship characterised by a high degree of 
mutual trust. 
•  Management consultants are best organised in independent, 
specialised firms with unique characteristics and success factors (as 
argued by Bower and Henderson).   20
3. TRANSACTION COST THEORY 
The above perspectives do not shed much light on why management 
consultants exist. Transaction cost theory, however, may do so. The theory 
deals with the real costs of allocating resources in an imperfect world of 
misunderstandings, misaligned goals, and uncertainty. Since management 
consultants deal with this very issue, it may be that the theory can help 
explain the existence of the profession. 
Transaction cost theory was initially developed in the 1930s by Ronald H. 
Coase to help explain why certain activities, products, or services are 
carried out internally in firms—while others are bought and sold in the 
marketplace. Coase’s ideas were neglected for many years, but around 
1970 several scholars started expanding on them. Most notable of these is 
Oliver E. Williamson, who over the last twenty-five years has dedicated 
his research to transaction-cost-theoretical issues. 
Unfortunately, this massive effort has not yielded a good definition of 
what transaction costs are, and there has been considerable criticism of the 
lack of clarity and testability of the theory. The following is yet another 
imperfect attempt at defining transaction costs. 
First, a company’s costs can be classified in two categories: production 
costs and transaction costs. Production costs are those we are most   21
familiar with. They are all the costs that are associated directly with 
productive activities (Masten 1982) such as manufacturing, logistics, and 
product development. Transaction costs, on the other hand, are those costs 
associated with organising economic activity. They thus vary with 
organisational form (Masten 1982). Or as Kenneth Arrow (1983) puts it, 
“The distinction between transaction costs and production costs is that the 
former can be varied by a change in the mode of resource allocation, while 
the latter only depend on the technology and tastes, and would be the 
same in all economic systems.” It has been estimated that at least 45 per 
cent of the gross national product in a developed society is generated by 
transaction costs (Wallis and North 1986; Ghertman 1998). 
Coase defined the term transaction costs in his pioneering work “The 
Nature of the Firm” (1937) by asking two fundamental questions: “Why is 
there any organisation?” and “Why isn’t all production carried out by one 
big firm?” His answer was that there are transaction costs that determine 
what is done in the market, with price as the regulating mechanism, and 
what is done inside the firm, with bureaucracy as the regulator. Coase 
pointed out that “the distinguishing mark of the firm is the supersession of 
the price mechanism.” Within this framework, all transactions carry a cost, 
either as an external market transaction cost or an internal bureaucratic 
transaction cost. “The limit to the size of the firm…[is reached] when the   22
costs of organizing additional transactions within the firm [exceed] the 
costs of carrying out the same transactions through the market” (Coase 
1993). As we will see later, this is exactly the issue for management 
consulting. Why do companies buy this service through a market 
transaction rather than doing it themselves? 
According to Coase (1937), the most important market transaction costs 
are the cost of determining the price of a product or service, the cost of 
negotiating and creating the contract, and the cost of information failure. 
The most important internal transaction costs are associated with the 
administrative cost of determining what, when, and how to produce, the 
cost of resource misallocation (since planning will never be perfect), and 
the cost of demotivation (since motivation is lower in large organisations). 
In any given industry the relative magnitude of market and internal 
transaction costs will determine what is done where. 
Williamson (1975, 1985) extended the argument by noting that two 
behavioural assumptions are critical. First, individuals in an organisation 
are boundedly rational. This, in the words of Herbert Simon ([1947] 1976), 
means that “human behavior is intendedly rational, but only limited so.” 
This limitation makes it impossible to structure perfect contracts, and any 
contract will be incomplete even if all information is available. Second, 
individuals behave opportunistically. This means that they will act in self-  23
interest with guile. While some object to this strong assumption, a number 
of studies have shown that it is valid in organisations (Williamson 1993), 
and it is a well-established tenet of Darwinian zoology (Dawkins 1989). 
The implication is that promises of responsible behaviour are only credible 
when they are supported by enforceable commitments, since individuals 
otherwise would break an agreement if it is in their self-interest to do so. 
With the two assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism, 
Williamson (1975) demonstrated that three factors play a fundamental role 
in determining if market or bureaucratic transactions are optimal. The 
factors are asset specificity, uncertainty, and frequency of transactions. 
By asset specificity is meant physical assets, human assets, site, or 
dedicated assets that have a specific usage and cannot easily be transferred 
to another use. Under this condition, opportunistic behaviour can be 
expected if the asset is part of a market transaction. 
An example is if a supplier invests in specific tooling equipment dedicated 
to one customer (or for that matter, if a consulting firm invests in a client 
relationship). Over time, the customer will be able to put pressure on the 
vendor since the vendor has no alternative use for its investment and will 
be willing to accept a price down to the variable cost of production to 
cover some fixed cost. This leads to a difficult negotiation in which each   24
party may try to “cheat” and in which complicated safeguards have to be 
incorporated in the contract. On the other hand, if the customer owns the 
equipment, then the incentive to cheat disappears, and the cost of creating 
safeguard contracts is eliminated because the asset is owned by the same 
company. 
High uncertainty such as business cycle volatility or technological 
uncertainty will lead to more bureaucratic transactions because it will be 
difficult, and prohibitively expensive, to create contracts that cover all 
possible outcomes. Thus, with higher uncertainty firms tend to internalise 
activities. 
Finally, if the transactions are frequent there is once again a tendency to 
manage the transaction through bureaucracy since the repetitive 
contracting cost will be higher than the bureaucratic cost. 
Empirical research has shown that the three factors above indeed do have 
an impact on the choice of transaction mechanism. For example, Masten 
(1984) demonstrated this within the aerospace industry, Teece (1981) and 
Klier (1993) within the automotive industry. 
The final important aspect of transaction cost theory pertinent to this 
paper restates an argument from the beginning of this section. Transaction   25
costs alone do not explain whether transactions are carried out in the 
market or internally in the firm. Douglass North, the 1994 Nobel Prize 
winner in economics, has forcefully pointed out that firms try to minimise 
total cost, not only transaction costs (North 1987, 1990; North and Wallis 
1994). In addition to transaction costs, a firm has production costs. 
Sometimes, and we will see this in the example of management consulting, 
transaction costs are not always minimised because the resulting 
improvement in production costs can outweigh the increase in transaction 
costs. 
We can now summarise transaction cost theory in the framework shown 
in Figure 1.   26




Finally, two specific applications of transaction cost theory will be used in 
the following two chapters. 
Aoki (1990) has identified some of the basic differences between Japanese 
and American style management, and then used elements of transaction 
cost theory to explain these differences. One of his observations is that 
spontaneous and voluntary coordination is much more prevalent than in 
Western firms. Thus the need for explicit performance contracts is 
reduced. This is achieved by having a long period of socialising among 
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promotion system built on seniority. A consequence is that it is critically 
important to have stable hierarchies with clearly defined roles, and it is 
difficult to inject outside expertise of a temporary nature. Thus, while 
Japanese firms are adept at using suppliers for standard products and 
services, they find it much more difficult to use high value-added services 
from the outside. 
Englander (1984) applied the theory to the short-lived practice of inside 
contracting that was prevalent in the early days of the manufacturing era, 
especially in New England. Under this system, owners contracted with 
suppliers to perform all operations within a factory, while providing the 
productive assets such as machinery. In essence, the inside contractor 
agreed on a transfer price with the owner, and then had the freedom to 
hire workers, develop work methods, and take whatever action necessary 
to generate a profit. 
The practice broke down for fundamental transaction-cost-theoretical 
reasons. The high asset specificity between owner and contractor 
(including physical, human, and site specificity) made it impossible to 
design contracts between owners and contractors that gave a fair share of 
profits to both parties. The contractor, having superior knowledge of 
operations, found ways to improve productivity beyond the expectation of 
the owner. Thus, supernormal rents accrued to the contractor. At the same   28
time, the internal contractor did not have many proprietary skills and it 
was therefore relatively easy for the owner to replace the inside contractor 
with his own supervisor and work force. By the end of the nineteenth 
century the inside contracting system had given way to the vertically 
integrated industrial firm where all resources—human and physical—
were under the control of management. One may wonder if management 
consulting, which has much in common with the inside contractor, will 
disappear in a similar way.   29
4. WHY DO MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS EXIST? 
Drucker (1979) expressed that “the management consultant is an 
extraordinary and indeed truly unique phenomenon.” He argued that 
there are two reasons for why it exists. First, management is neither a 
science nor an art; it is a practice learned through exposure to and 
experience with a wide variety of companies in a wide variety of 
industries. A typical executive, however, lacks that exposure. As Drucker 
notes: “he works with the same organization—or at the most, with very 
few. He lacks exposure and cannot gain it. Nor can he simulate it.” 
Consultants, on the other hand, transcend organisations and thus gain 
exposure. 
Second, Drucker observed that executives yearn for objective insights into 
their management problems. Empirical research by Gattiker and Larwood 
(1985) confirmed that clients first and foremost look for stimulation, 
expertise and objectivity when they turn to outside consultants. 
Both these explanations for why management consultants exist are 
compelling, but they suffer from not being anchored in an underlying 
theory. Transaction cost theory provides a rigorous and consistent 
explanation for the existence of management consulting. To understand   30
the growth of management consulting within a transaction-cost-theoretical 
context, two fundamental questions need to be answered: 
•  Why is there increasing demand for the types of services management 
consultants provide? 
•  Why is this demand best filled by external consultants who are not 
direct employees of the firm—but rather by contracted outsiders? 
4.1  DEMAND FOR MANAGEMENT CONSULTING SERVICES 
In the first chapter, Greiner and Metzger (1983) defined what management 
consultants do: they help solve management problems by giving objective 
and independent advice. Why is there such extraordinary demand for 
these types of services today compared to fifty years ago? An answer is 
provided by Wallis and North (1986) who studied changes in the US 
economy between 1870 and 1970 by dividing the gross national product 
into production cost and transaction cost components. They further 
divided transaction costs into market transaction costs (such as the costs of 
buying and selling in the marketplace) and bureaucratic transaction costs 
(such as the costs of coordinating activities within firms) along the lines 
suggested in the transaction cost framework shown in Figure 1 (see p. 26, 
above).   31
While national accounts and census data do not easily conform to this 
breakdown, Wallis and North nevertheless managed to show that 
transaction costs have become an increasingly important part of the US 
economy. They estimated that transaction costs increased from 8 to 45 per 
cent of the economy between 1870 and 1970, with the highest growth 
occurring in bureaucratic (internal) transaction costs. Applying the same 
methodology to subsequent years, a continued increase in transaction 
costs was found by Ghertman (1998). 
To understand this trend, consider how the following underlying 
mechanism might operate. As companies strive to reduce production costs 
by exploiting scale and scope economies, they must specialise—which in 
turn leads to a need for internal coordination. If transaction costs did not 
exist, then the largest company in each market would also be the most 
profitable company, since coordination between functions could be 
achieved without effort. But because of transaction costs, this does not 
happen. Instead, large companies must deploy considerable coordination 
resources in order to realise production scale and scope economies. On 
balance, this pays off, and total productivity increases year after year. 
Reductions in production costs are larger than the additional bureaucratic 
transaction costs incurred, and therefore value added grows.   32
Thus, traditional blue-collar jobs are disappearing as production costs are 
reduced, while the number of white-collar jobs aimed at coordination is 
increasing. Moreover, more effort is spent on creating the appropriate 
contractual mechanisms inside and between firms. Witness, for example, 
the increased use of non-traditional forms of cooperation between firms 
through different forms of alliances and partnerships. 
As a consequence, senior executives today deal primarily with abstract 
issues relating to transaction costs, while fifty or a hundred years ago they 
concentrated on more concrete tasks aimed at reducing production costs. 
Therefore, the role of top management in a large company has changed 
beyond recognition. In one of the most famous books by a chief executive, 
Alfred P. Sloan, Jr.’s ([1963] 1990) description of General Motors under his 
stewardship, illustrates the point. The book deals almost exclusively with 
production-cost issues in sales, manufacturing, development, and finance, 
and has an insignificant amount of abstraction. Most of the excerpts from 
executive committee meeting minutes deal with practical issues such as 
forecasting and inventory build-up, production schedules, project-
development issues, and cash management. Other illustrations can be 
found in old corporate annual reports. The opening statement in Asea’s2 
1948 annual report concerns factory utilisation. It goes on to discuss 
                                                 
2  Today part of Asea Brown Boveri (ABB), the Swedish-Swiss electrical-engineering conglomerate.   33
manufacturing and product-development issues, and ignores what today 
we call strategic and organisational issues. 
In contrast, while today’s executives still must manage production costs, 
an even larger challenge lies in optimising transaction costs. As Herbert 
Simon ([1947] 1976) anticipated: “In the postindustrial society, the central 
problem is not how to organize production efficiently (although this will 
always remain an important consideration), but how to organize to make 
decisions, that is, to process information.” The level of abstraction has 
increased commensurately. Today we talk about vision, strategic intent, 
learning organisations and virtual corporations. We find that most 
companies’ value can not be calculated by studying the income statement 
and balance sheet alone, since much of the market value is embedded in 
abstractions such as brand image and intellectual capital. 
In this world, it is necessary to be good at symbol manipulation (Reich 
1991): “Symbolic analysts solve, identify, and broker problems by 
manipulating symbols. They simplify reality into abstract images that can 
be rearranged, juggled, experimented with, communicated to other 
specialists, and then, eventually, transformed back into reality.” The 
symbols are often qualitative rather than quantitative. Examples are the 
five forces framework and the value chain developed by Michael E. Porter, 
and the 7-S framework designed by McKinsey & Company. Reich   34
estimated that in 1990 close to 20 per cent of American jobs were held by 
“symbolic analysts”, while at mid-century no more than 8 per cent of 
workers could be so classified. Thus, as the transaction cost part of the 
economy has grown, so has the demand for symbol manipulation. 
4.2 NATURE  OF  DEMAND 
The transaction cost framework can also be used to more specifically 
deduce the nature of this demand. 
First, bureaucratic (internal) transaction costs principally stem from the 
cost of administration, the costs of resource misallocation, and the 
negative impact of demotivation in large organisations. Management 
techniques aimed at minimising these can, for example, be found within 
the fields of organisational design, strategic planning, and governance. 
Organisational design influences the cost of administration and the level 
of motivation significantly. An example is the superior performance of 
multidivisional organisations over functional organisations (Armour and 
Teece 1978). Strategic planning reduces resource misallocation by 
channelling scarce resources into areas where the company has a 
competitive advantage. The appropriate choice of governance models 
helps improve motivation through incentives, and reduces organisational   35
slack such as excessive bureaucracy. These are exactly the kinds of 
problems management consultants solve. 
Second, market transaction costs derive from price determination, contract 
negotiation, and the risk that there will be long-term deviations from the 
contract due to unanticipated events. To reduce these costs, executives 
primarily need information. The demand for market and competitive 
information—and the intelligent synthesis of this information—has 
increased dramatically over the last thirty years. Services such as these are 
offered by management consultants. 
In sum, the increase in demand for management consulting services is 
explained by fundamental shifts in the economy. Today’s complex 
business environment requires high transaction costs to function. This in 
turn increases demand for symbolic analysts, the kinds of professionals 
found in modern management consulting firms. Stryker (1954) identified 
this trend years ago when he observed that consultants used to work on 
“specialized problems—in plant layout, for example, or in wage-incentive 
programs”, but “a relatively new kind of consultant—the man or firm that 
in effect offers to set a company’s basic objectives, policies, structure, and 
strategies” was emerging.   36
4.3  REASONS FOR USING EXTERNAL MANAGEMENT 
CONSULTANTS 
Why then is the demand for symbol manipulation satisfied largely by 
external management consultants? After all, corporate executives could do 
the symbol manipulation themselves, or they could use internal 
consultants. Instead they often turn to outside help, causing a 20 per cent 
annual growth in the industry since 1980. It has not always been this way. 
Once upon a time, executives did the work themselves. Chandler (1962) 
described how executives at the du Pont Company struggled between 
1917 and 1921 with how to organise the company. They created working 
parties and ad hoc committees, and at the same time worked individually 
on position papers and proposals. No consultants were involved. 
Similarly, when General Motors faced a major crisis in 1920, it turned to 
one of its senior executives, Alfred P. Sloan, Jr., to diagnose and solve the 
problem. Sloan’s write-up, the Organization Study (1919), soon catapulted 
him into the chairmanship of General Motors, without the help of 
consultants. 
Over time, however, the do-it-yourself approach has declined due to its 
inefficiency. Typically, a senior executive is not familiar with the particular 
problem he or she is facing and does not know which problem-solving 
technique to apply. This is increasingly true as management becomes   37
more complex. Executives remain boundedly rational (Simon [1947] 1976); 
and, of course, they do not have the capacity to learn everything. 
Thus, the choice for the executive often is whether to turn to internal or 
external experts for advice. According to transaction cost theory, this 
choice hinges on the degree of asset specificity, demand volatility, 
technological uncertainty, and the frequency of transactions involved (see 
Chapter 3). If these factors are insignificant, then buying the services in the 
external market will be the better solution (Rubin 1990): “When a 
competitive market exists, this usually offers the most powerful method of 
controlling costs. If a product is made internally, then the firm must spend 
substantial managerial resources monitoring costs and efficiencies…The 
first presumption should always be for purchasing inputs on the market.” 
What, then, can be said about the degree of asset specificity, uncertainty, 
and frequency of transactions in management consulting services? The 
two latter factors have worked in favour of using outsiders, although their 
influence probably is weak. Uncertainty has decreased over the last fifty 
years, as evidenced by the decline in volatility of the S&P 500 index and of 
GDP growth. The frequency of transactions is usually low, with most 
problems to be solved being unique and singular.   38
Asset specificity stands alone as the most important factor. It can be 
broken down into four components: physical asset specificity, human asset 
specificity, site specificity, and dedicated assets. Giving consulting advice 
does not usually require an investment in physical assets that are specific 
to the client, and when it does (such as the purchase of client-specific 
software), the cost is usually billed directly to the client. Site specificity is 
low since the consultant rarely moves permanently to the client’s location. 
Dedicated assets that cannot be redeployed are uncommon. The only 
aspect of asset specificity that truly affects the decision to use internal or 
external experts is human asset specificity. That is, the extent to which the 
consultant’s knowledge is specific to the client. 
4.3.1 Human  Asset  Specificity 
High human asset specificity exists if the consultants need to invest 
significant time and effort to understand the client’s business, or 
conversely, if the client needs to invest in understanding how the 
consultants work. In Turner’s (1982) eight task categories described in 
Chapter 2 (see pp. 14-15, above), there is an increasing degree of human 
asset specificity the further down the list the consultant works. Task 1: 
“Providing information to a client”, usually does not require a client-
specific investment, while Task 8: “Permanently improving organisational   39
effectiveness”, demands that the consultants have a thorough 
understanding of the idiosyncrasies of the client organisation—an 
understanding that often takes at least a year to build. 
If human asset specificity is high, then there is significant risk that the 
client or the outside consultant will try to take advantage of the other 
party, a so-called hold-up situation. For example, the client may try to 
reduce the price or ask for free additional work since it knows that the 
consulting firm cannot easily reassign people who have invested in 
building an understanding of the client organisation. Similarly, 
consultants know that it will take time for the client to find, evaluate, and 
build the knowledge of a new consultant. In the end, it may be easier for 
the client to avoid the hold-up situation by using internal resources rather 
than to go through a painful negotiation with outsiders. 
Thus, all other things being equal, external consultants can be expected to 
work on issues that have low human asset specificity, while internal 
experts deal with issues close to the heart of the organisation. Indeed, this 
is the way symbol manipulation was done until the 1970s, with fast-
growing internal consulting staffs (such as those at General Electric and 
Xerox (Kelley 1979)) addressing core issues, and external consultants 
working primarily on projects with low human asset specificity.   40
4.3.2  Rationale for External Consultants 
But all other things are not equal. External consultants have been able to 
use three other transaction cost-related factors to their advantage, while 
trying to minimise the negative impact of high human asset specificity. 
First, opportunistic behaviour can be expected within and between firms. 
As specialisation to realise scale and scope economies increases, this 
opportunism becomes stronger, given that specialisation leads to goal 
conflicts between organisational units and individuals. A manager in 
marketing will not necessarily have the same goal as a manager in 
manufacturing, even though the goal of the company is to maximise 
shareholder returns. Thus, the risk of efficiency losses due to misaligned 
goals increases with the growth of transaction costs. To offset this, 
executives more than ever need objective, detached advice. 
Who then can best provide the objectivity? External management 
consultants have the benefit of not being members of the organisation. 
They usually do not have vested interests or oblique loyalties. (The 
counterargument is that the consultant has one unique sponsor to whom 
he or she will yield if necessary. Research (Gattiker and Larwood 1985), 
however, suggests that this does not happen often enough to warrant 
concern.)   41
In addition to giving impartial advice on key issues, consultants can also 
perform managerial audits. Traditionally, this has been within the domain 
of accountants, but as the complexity of organisations has increased, the 
ability of accountants to detect shirking has decreased (Rubin 1990). 
External management consultants have to a large extent filled this void. In 
transaction-cost terms, the external management consultant is more likely 
than an internal counterpart to lessen the bureaucratic insularity of top 
management and to reduce internal transaction costs due to misallocation 
of resources within and between functions. 
Second, for those activities that do not carry high human asset specificity 
vis-à-vis the client, external consultants can build experience more 
effectively than can inside consultants. Having seen similar problems 
before, the cost to external consultants for leveraging this knowledge base 
will be low. In contrast, internal consultants are experts in how their own 
company works, but seldom are they in a position to create an experience 
base by problem type. 
Also, the external consultant often has the opportunity to engage in joint 
problem solving with colleagues (Paroush 1985). Such collaboration is 
encouraged by the incentive structure of consulting firms. Replicating this 
type of system within a client organisation is difficult because most client   42
organisations are joint stock companies with very different reward 
systems. 
Third, external consulting firms are likely to out-produce their internal 
counterparts. Incentives are more easily tailored to the needs and 
performance of individuals in smaller organisations, while employees in 
larger organisations suffer from bureaucratically induced demotivation 
(and most consulting firms are smaller than their clients). A parallel is 
found in R&D, where smaller companies have three to ten times higher 
productivity than larger companies (Cooper 1964; Zenger 1994). 
The three factors just described are advantages held by external 
consultants relative to internal consultants. Consulting firms also often 
manage to offset the negative impact of high human asset specificity 
through contractual mechanisms. In accordance with the transaction cost 
framework, it is in external consultants’ interest to minimise the cost of 
price determination, negotiation, and the impact of long-term deviations 
from the agreed-upon contract. Price determination can be simplified by 
charging a fixed monthly fee, with the cost to the client is proportional to 
the length of the project. Negotiations are possibly burdensome, but can be 
alleviated by using short and standardised proposals. The risk of 
deviations from the intended task is usually small because most efforts are 
relatively brief and there is constant feedback between client and   43
consultant. Projects seldom take more than one year, and the norm is three 
to nine months. Consultants further reduce this risk by providing easy 
exits for the client, such as agreements that the work can be terminated 
without advance notice and without a stated reason. What is sometimes 
viewed as a less-than-rigorous contracting policy is in fact a mechanism 
for consultants to offer their services more efficiently. 
The above logic can now be summarised in Figure 2, which captures all 
elements of the discussion in this section. 




Earlier, the question why we have seen an explosion in the demand for 
management consulting in the United States, but not in Japan, was posed 
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(see p. 10, above). The answer is complicated, but lies embedded in the 
figure above. Part of the answer lies in Japanese and Americans being at 
different stages in the management-skill development cycle. More 
important, Japanese management tradition places so much reliance on the 
long-term predictability of careers and protecting organisational 
knowledge that it is difficult for outsiders to be accepted by large 
corporations. External consultants’ disruptive effects on clients’ 
management processes, so far, have outweighed the benefits of their 
expertise, stimulation, and objectivity. That is, the human asset specificity 
is high, leading to internal problem solving within companies.   45
5. HOW WILL MANAGEMENT CONSULTING 
EVOLVE? 
Management consulting firms exist for a good reason: the nature of 
management has changed. Unlike in earlier times, abstract issues 
embodied in the transaction-cost part of the economy demand 
management’s attention. Consequently, there is a market for symbol 
manipulation—a market that barely existed fifty to a hundred years ago. 
External management consultants are well suited to meet this demand. 
They bring objectivity, experience, and high productivity. Working with 
outside experts often, though not always, can cost the client less than 
using internal resources, when both direct and indirect costs are factored 
in. As we will see in this chapter, this is likely to hold true in the future as 
well. 
Forty-five years ago, management consulting was considered “one of the 
hottest—and most influential—growth industries” (Stryker 1954). If 
anything, this is even more the case today. Many observers expect that 
consultants will continue to increase market share in problem solving on 
behalf of corporations and other organisations—and thus there will be 
continued industry growth. On the other hand, it may be that clients 
eventually will reclaim the services provided by management 
consultants—especially those with high human asset specificity. This 
would parallel the disappearance of the inside contracting system   46
discussed in Chapter 3. Under this scenario, the consulting industry could 
stagnate and decline. 
5.1  CONTINUED GROWTH SCENARIO 
Remember that the key obstacle to using external resources such as 
management consultants—according to transaction cost theory—is the 
degree of human asset specificity involved, and that high uncertainty 
makes it difficult to use outside contractors. For the growth scenario to 
materialise, the following conditions will have to exist: 
The current trend toward management consultants’ deeper involvement in 
solving clients’ core problems would have to moderate. If it does not, asset 
specificity will increase to the point of making external sourcing of 
consulting services unfeasible. Alternatively, contractual arrangements 
between client and consultant would need refinement at a sufficient pace 
in order to mitigate the increasingly negative effects of asset specificity; 
witness, for example, the increasing use of success fees that tend to align 
the objectives of clients and consultants. 
The internal bureaucracy costs of client organisations would have to 
remain at current or higher levels. If, however, clients can reduce the costs 
of administration, resource misallocation, and demotivation, then   47
transaction cost theory tells us that symbol manipulation done internally is 
more advantageous. Indeed, highly bureaucratic organisations tend to use 
more external management consultants do than lean ones. (A continued 
high level of internal bureaucracy costs will stimulate demand for external 
management consultants.) 
Uncertainty (in terms of demand volatility or technological uncertainty) 
can not increase significantly, given that high uncertainty reduces the 
benefit of buying products or services from the outside. 
If the foregoing growth scenario develops more or less as outlined, then 
we could see a radically different corporate world within fifteen to thirty 
years. Initially, we would see continued rapid expansion of the 
management consulting industry. Soon there would be as many external 
symbol manipulators as there are executives in large companies. Over 
time, the balance of power would shift to the management consultants. 
They would possess the most knowledge about management practice in 
general, and their clients’ problems specifically. They would own the 
knowledge networks that will be essential in the global economy. The 
management consulting firms would also attract most of the young, 
intelligent and well-educated people forming the backbone of the future 
economy. We thus would see a shift in the balance of influence from the 
traditional product and services sectors to the symbolic analyst sector—  48
just as we saw a shift of influence from the agriculture sector to the 
industrial sector in the 1800s. 
Ultimately, management consulting firms would move from being 
advisors to taking over the management function of their clients. We 
would see a new corporate configuration in which the consultants work as 
the symbol manipulators of corporations, and the old corporate structures 
are dismantled to provide the building blocks for those manipulative 
activities. Consultants would manage high value-added networks of 
product design and delivery activities, whereby they would provide 
strategic and integrative capabilities. The old corporations would provide 
low value-added products, subassemblies, and services to the specification 
of the network operators—the management consultants. 
5.2 DECLINE  SCENARIO 
Under the second scenario, management consulting would be doomed, 
just as inside contracting once flourished and then declined. How would 
this “doomsday” scenario come to be? 
The asset specificity of management consulting advice would need to be 
so high that clients would find it difficult to handle the interface between   49
themselves and consultants and thus decide to internalise symbol 
manipulation. 
Large corporations would have to develop their management practices to 
accommodate the needs of different types of employees, both symbolic 
analysts and routine workers. In particular, this would require 
differentiated approaches to performance evaluation and the setting of 
incentives (a process that has already started as evidenced by the 
escalating compensation packages lavished on executives). 
Uncertainty would have to increase to a significantly higher level than it is 
today. 
The types of problems handled by management consultants would have to 
become more prevalent within client firms. (Remember, as an activity 
becomes more frequent there is a tendency to internalise it.) 
Should all these things happen, we may live to see a second version of the 
demise of inside contracting. Clients would initially hire away top talent 
from consulting firms to do the same jobs as before and with the same 
compensation—but now as employees. The alignment of high asset 
specificity with internal sourcing would over time prove more cost 
effective than buying consulting services from the outside. Knowledge   50
accumulation would then shift toward the clients, and management 
consulting firms would find it increasingly difficult to provide high value-
added advice. However, since management consultants also would be 
providing an auditing function, and assuming they provided objective 
advice, they would not disappear entirely. The nature of their work, 
however, might well shift from Schein’s expert and doctor-patient models 
to the process consultation model—one in which the consultant facilitates 
and the client provides the expertise. 
Under such a decline scenario, external management consultants would 
work primarily on routine assignments. Yes, they would continue to 
leverage industry knowledge from client to client, much as McKinsey & 
Company and others do today. But by its very definition, this knowledge 
is most unlikely to add unique value to the individual client. Furthermore, 
opportunities to work on core issues such as strategy and governance 
would be highly limited. In the end, the consulting process would become 
substantially streamlined and highly efficient; however, the industry no 
longer would be able to attract the best people. Management consulting 
will cease to be “one of the hottest—and most influential—growth 
industries.”   51
5.3  FUTURE ROLE OF MANAGEMENT CONSULTANTS 
In the end, neither of these two scenarios seems very likely to fully evolve. 
Nevertheless, looking to the next ten or fifteen years, several factors favour 
the “continued-growth scenario”. 
So far, the management consulting industry has been able to largely 
surmount the hurdle of asset specificity and thereby redefine an 
appropriate division of labour between clients and consultants. New 
forms of collaboration have made it easier for clients to outsource problem 
solving of core issues. An example is the tendency of consulting firms to 
strive for long-term relationships with clients as opposed to working on 
one project per client. Another example is that consultants have been 
backing away from the classical model of “consultants analyse and 
recommend; clients decide and implement.” Collaboration today is much 
more sophisticated than it was a mere fifteen years ago, with clients and 
consultants now working together throughout the entire change process. 
This trend can be expected to continue. 
Of at least equal significance (with or without reengineering and the like): 
there is no indication that internal (bureaucratic) transaction costs within 
large corporations will decline. To the contrary, as noted earlier, the 
transaction-cost part of the economy has grown steadily since the 1870s.   52
Nor is this trend likely to be disrupted any time in the foreseeable future. 
For one thing, the increasingly global economy adds to complexity. Within 
large corporations, the demand for coordination continues unabated. New 
technologies such as artificial intelligence appear unlikely to change this 
picture any time soon. 
Finally, there is scant evidence that large corporations will be able to 
realign their management processes sufficiently in order to be able to 
internalise symbol manipulation. Stinchcombe (1965) found that the way a 
company manages itself to a large degree is determined by when it was 
founded. Most large companies, being fairly old, seem unlikely to 
fundamentally change their modus operandi, despite the opportunities 
presented by the information technology revolution. 
If the above arguments hold true, the management consulting industry 
will continue to prosper. Consultants, together with other external 
advisors, will play an increasingly important role in the global economy 
and may ultimately take on the role of network managers. Relationships 
between clients and consultants will grow stronger and symbiotic. 
Management consulting will continue to be a preferred career choice for 
many graduating students at the premier business schools and 
universities.   53
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